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The world is threatened with a pandemic. Such an event, considered by many to be the 
greatest public health risk the world faces, has the potential to kill up to forty or fifty 
million people, sicken hundreds of millions, and significantly impact the global 
economy. Countries and health organizations throughout the world are monitoring the 
threat and developing strategic plans and systems to prepare for what many consider an 
inevitable and possibly imminent event.  
The United States has made it a national priority to develop strategic plans to 
coordinate preparedness and response efforts at the federal, state, and local levels. A 
relatively small but critical aspect of these plans calls for the utilization of the National 
Disaster Medical System’s (NDMS) civilian-based medical teams, to assist state and 
local governments in the event of a pandemic. Generally, past deployments of these 
federal assets have had positive results; however, the reliance on these civilian-based 
medical teams for response in a pandemic is problematic. The medical professionals 
who primarily comprise the team may be more reluctant to participate in a pandemic 
due to the increased health risks to themselves and their families. Moreover, the 
hospitals and medical systems that employ these civilian responders may be unwilling 
or unable to allow their participation in the federal response system. The federal 
government should reconsider its reliance on this civilian-based resource in the event of 
a pandemic, and focus instead on enhancing existing state and local public health and 
medical capabilities and resources.  
 
Background  
A pandemic occurs when a new influenza virus manifests itself, and is spread easily 
from human to human through coughing and sneezing. Because there is no immunity to 
this virus, the severity of the illness is significantly increased. While influenza 
pandemics are rare, occurring three times in the previous century (in 1918, 1957, and 
1968), they have the potential to cause more death and illness than any other public 
health threat. According to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), a 1918-scale 
pandemic would sicken approximately ninety million people and kill two million more 
in the U.S. alone.1 “Almost ten million people could be hospitalized during the course of 
the pandemic, which may take more than a year to evolve.”2  Modeling based on the 
more conservative 1957 pandemic projects more than 200,000 deaths and over 
800,000 hospitalizations within the United States.3 
A pandemic is certain to occur, but when and how it will manifest is unknown. 
Currently, within the scientific and public health communities, there is particular 
concern with the virus H5N1. Commonly referred to as “avian” or “bird flu,” H5N1 is a 
strain of influenza that has primarily infected wild and domestic birds in Asia and parts 
of Europe. As the birds migrate, the virus spreads to bird populations in other countries. 
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“Most cases of avian influenza infection in humans have resulted from direct or close 
contact with infected poultry or surfaces contaminated with secretions and excretions 
from infected birds.”4 According to the World Health Organization, as of May 7, 2007 
there have been 291 confirmed cases with 172 deaths.5 “Of additional concern are the 
few instances where secondary transmission from person to person may have occurred. 
Given these events, we are currently in a Pandemic Alert Phase 3, defined by WHO as 
‘human infections with a new subtype but no human-to-human spread or at most rare 
instances of spread to a close contact.’”6 The rapid global spread of the H5N1 virus, the 
potential human-to-human transmission, and the potentially devastating consequences 
have created a sense of urgency within the U.S. government to assess various response 
capabilities and develop effective preparedness measures. Unfortunately, the need to 
develop those measures quickly has caused the federal government to overlook or ignore 
the reality that existing NDMS resources are inadequate to meet the demands a 
pandemic would place on them. 
  
FEDERAL RESPONSE STRATEGY 
Over the past several years the federal government has instituted several strategic plans 
in preparation for the pandemic: the National Response Plan (specifically ESF #8 and 
the Biological Incident Index) in December 2004, the National Strategy for Pandemic 
Influenza and HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan in November 2005, and the 
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy in May 2006. These plans guide our 
national pandemic preparedness and response efforts, emphasize the importance of 
state, local, and individual preparedness, require all federal agencies and departments 
(including federal health care systems) to develop the necessary pandemic plans, and 
identify Health and Human Services as the lead federal agency for medical response in a 
pandemic.     
In the event that the H5N1 virus mutates into a contagious human-to-human 
influenza this year, or a different pandemic strikes in ten years, the implementation of 
the National Response Plan (NRP) would be necessary:  
[The NRP] provides a conceptual and operational framework to integrate the 
capabilities and resources of various governmental jurisdictions, incident 
management, and emergency response disciplines, nongovernmental 
organizations, and the private sector into a cohesive, coordinated, and seamless 
national framework for domestic incident management.7  
The NRP breaks down the individual department and agency capabilities and 
responsibilities into Emergency Support Functions (ESF):  
[Health and Human Services (HHS)] has the primary responsibility for 
implementing ESF #8 – Public Health and Medical Services – which provides the 
mechanism for coordinated federal government assistance to supplement state, 
local, and tribal resources in response to public health and medical care needs in 
the face of a potential or actual large-scale public health and medical emergency.8  
According to the plan, HHS will confer with state and local medical officials to 
determine what type of medical or public heath assistance is required. HHS will then 
coordinate internal response assets such as U.S. Public Health Service Commissioned 
Corps., medical reserve corps, and the NDMS to provide the required assistance:  
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Assets internal to HHS are deployed directly as part of the ESF #8 response. 
Public health and medical personnel and teams provided by ESF #8 
organizations are requested by HHS and deployed by the respective organizations 
to provide appropriate public health and medical assistance.9  
NDMS is a primary support agency to HHS during a pandemic. “NDMS was established 
to create a single, integrated national medical response capability that ensures that 
resources are available in the event of a major disaster or emergency.”10  
The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) is a section within the United 
States Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), Response Division, Operations Branch, and is 
responsible for supporting Federal agencies in the management and coordination 
of the Federal medical response to major emergencies and federally declared 
disasters…It is the mission of the NDMS to design, develop, and maintain a 
national capability to deliver quality medical care to the victims of, and 
responders to, a domestic disaster. NDMS provides state of the art medical care 
under any conditions at a disaster site, in transit from the impacted area, and into 
participating definitive care facilities.11  
NDMS relies on various specialized medical response teams to meet this integrated 
national medical response capability. 
The NDMS is made up of more than 9,000 health and medical personnel organized 
into approximately 107 response teams.12 The medical response teams are civilian 
based, and are comprised primarily of medical professionals from the various 
disciplines necessary to meet the specific team’s mission. The medical professionals are 
required to maintain the necessary certifications and licensures within their discipline; 
as such, each member is typically affiliated with, or employed by, a medical center, 
health department, or disaster organization. Upon activation, the team members are re-
classified as intermittent federal employees. The response teams and individual team 
members are then covered for worker’s compensation, liability, and medical 
malpractice.13  
NDMS has a number of response teams, each designed with a specific area of 
expertise. In addition to the various medical teams, there are management support 
teams, veterinary assistance teams, and mortuary teams. Although these teams have the 
potential to be activated and utilized in a pandemic, the focus of this discussion will be 
the medical response teams, as they will be the primary response assets deployed by 
NDMS to assist state and local authorities in a pandemic. The following briefly describes 
each team:     
Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) is a group of professional and para-
professional medical personnel designed to provide medical care during a 
disaster or other event.  Teams are composed of physicians, nurses, paramedics, 
emergency medical technicians, pharmacists, mental health specialists, dentists, 
therapists, laboratory and environmental health specialists, logisticians and 
administrative support. Each team has a sponsoring organization, such as a 
major medical center, public health or safety agency, non-profit, public or private 
organization that signs a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the DHS. The 
DMAT sponsor organizes the team and recruits members, arranges training, and 
coordinates the dispatch of the team.14  
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The DMATs are designed to be a rapid response element, deployable in six to twelve 
hours, self sufficient for seventy-two hours, and remain on-site for up to fourteen days. 
“DMAT services remain on site for the duration of an extended response, operating on a 
rotating schedule of personnel and equipment.”15 They have a quasi-paramilitary 
structure, and although they can be utilized for various types of incidents, their training 
has traditionally focused on mass casualty and mass trauma events.16      
The primary mission of the National Medical Response Team (NMRT) is to respond 
to WMD incidents. The team has multiple capabilities, including mass decontamination, 
medical treatment and care, and WMD detection and monitoring. There are a total of 
four NMRTs within the United States, three of which are civilian-based. The non-
civilian based team is located in the Washington DC Metropolitan area, and is primarily 
comprised of professional fire fighters, paramedics, law enforcement officers, and 
hazardous materials specialists from the surrounding jurisdictions.  
The National Pharmacy Response Team (NPRT) and the National Nurse 
Response Team (NNRT), formed in 2002, are located in each of the 10 Federal 
Emergency Management Agency regions. They provide assistance during events 
requiring chemoprophylaxis, mass vaccinations, patient education, and risk 
communications. NRPTs are sponsored by a working group of the Joint 




The NDMS is not prepared for a pandemic. It does not have a strategic influenza 
response plan; there is insufficient management staffing at headquarters, and 
inadequate training and personal protective equipment at the team level; and NDMS 
operates under the misguided assumption that its teams will be 100% available for a 
response in a pandemic.   
Although the NDMS plays a central role in the nation’s response plans, it does not 
have its own strategic influenza response plan. Moreover, there is no specific 
information available on how these teams will be deployed and utilized in a pandemic. It 
is difficult to understand how an agency that has a primary medical mission in a 
pandemic does not have a strategic plan. The lack of a strategic plan does have one 
benefit: assets and resources are not bound by the operational restrictions within the 
plan. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the NMRT-Central was deployed to 
Houston to provide showering facilities for the evacuated New Orleans’ citizens. NMRT-
Central’s mass decontamination capabilities were designed for emergency WMD 
incidents but could be adapted to provide regular shower facilities. Given the uncertain 
demands and needs in emergency situations, NDMS teams must be prepared to perform 
a wide range of services if activated in a pandemic. In addition to providing medical care 
to the sick in a pandemic, they could potentially be utilized to provide mass vaccination 
or anti-viral medication, assist with hospital surge capacity, transportation of patients, 
triaging patients, and assisting with isolation and quarantine issues.  
NDMS’s management staffing was drastically reduced from 144 to fifty-seven in the 
transition to DHS.18 Although improvements have occurred since the transition back to 
HHS, this reduction in staffing has compromised leadership’s ability to adequately 
manage its resources and advance preparedness efforts throughout the NDMS.  
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NDMS’s broad mission is carried down to the team level. Although the various teams 
have specific missions, they are, first and foremost, medical assets and as such may be 
utilized for a variety of medical scenarios. This unspecified response mission makes it 
difficult for teams to adequately train and provide the necessary personal protective 
equipment (PPE). Appropriate training and PPE have been determined to be critical 
factors in studies conducted on the medical and public health workers’ willingness to 
work in catastrophic events. “In evaluating the willingness of Israeli health care workers 
to report to work after an unconventional missile attack, they found that although 42% 
of the respondents were willing to report to work, the percentage would increase to 86% 
if personal safety measures were provided.”19 Another study determined that  
preparedness training and education was the single most important construct.20 It is 
impossible for NDMS to provide adequate training and PPE, if does not know which and 
how their teams will be utilized. 
These NDMS teams have provided, and will continue to provide, important medical 
assistance in certain emergencies or events. However, the federal government’s blanket 
reliance and promotion of these assets to the state and local governments as a resource 
in a pandemic could have tragic consequences. Indeed, there may not be sufficient 
medical personnel available to formulate and deploy these NDMS teams to the extent 
that they are being promoted. There are three primary reasons for this:  1) The fear and 
increased health risks associated with the pandemic may reduce the availability of team 
members; 2) The medical establishments, in which the team members are associated or 
employed, may not allow their participation in the NDMS system during a pandemic; 
and 3) Health care workers will likely be unavailable for extended periods of time. 
The fear and increased health risks associated with the pandemic will reduce the 
availability of NDMS team members during a pandemic. Although there are no studies 
conducted specifically on the NDMS system with regard to medical professional 
participation in a pandemic, several studies have focused on the general health care 
worker and the public health community. Analyzing this information is important, not 
only because these occupational areas will play a major role in a pandemic, but health 
care and public health workers make up a large portion of the NDMS teams. One could 
infer that the results of surveying NDMS team members would be consistent with the 
findings in these reports.  
According to one report, Health Care Workers’ Ability and Willingness to Report to 
Duty During Catastrophic Disasters, “the most frequently cited reasons for employees’ 
unwillingness to report to duty during a disaster was fear and concern for the safety of 
their families and themselves.”21 This fear would be exacerbated for the NDMS team 
member because of the potential extended deployment and the increased and intense 
patient contact involved in a pandemic response. Furthermore, the study showed that 
the willingness of health care workers to report to work during a catastrophic event were 
lowest for events “in which the employees are more likely to perceive the highest degree 
of risk to themselves or their family (smallpox, chemical, radiation, and SARS).”22  
In any catastrophic event, medical professionals must balance fear with their 
professional obligations and responsibilities. In 2004, I experienced this firsthand when 
I was deployed to Punta Gorda, Florida to assist with the Hurricane Charlie relief 
efforts. I was assigned to assist managing the local ESF #8 and was surprised to find 
upon my arrival that a large number of local medical and public health care workers had 
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evacuated the area. Moreover, that same year during Hurricane Francis, twenty-five 
nurses were fired or suspended for leaving early or not reporting to work.23   
The local public health community, if sufficiently staffed, will most likely be the 
backbone during a pandemic response. The HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan identifies the 
roles and responsibilities of the state and local public health agencies during a pandemic 
to include providing regular updates to public health providers, offering guidance on 
infection control, and investigating pandemic cases and particular situations.24 These 
actions would require an immediate response by a significant number of local public 
health workers. A recent study suggests that these numbers will not be available in a 
pandemic, as nearly half of the local health department workers are likely not to report 
for duty.25 
A more significant problem requiring immediate federal attention is the insufficient 
staffing levels in the majority of public health departments. “The public health 
infrastructure has been cut to a point where most health agencies are barely staffed to 
operate during a normal workweek.”26 The federal government cannot expect state and 
local public health officials to effectively plan and prepare for a pandemic when current 
staffing levels are inadequate.   
To make matters worse, the hospitals, public health departments, or medical systems 
with which the medical professionals are affiliated may not allow their participation 
within NDMS system in the event of a pandemic. The primary reasons for that refusal 
would be the anticipated exponential increase in patients and the reduced health care 
workforce in their own communities. The impact on the hospital system will be 
enormous, particularly because most hospitals already operate at maximum capacity. 
The pandemic is expected to quickly fill the capacity and capabilities of most hospitals; 
in fact “most Americans would be unable to access the health care sector because 
demand will exceed supply by large factors that cannot be bridged by incremental, 
marginal increases in health care capacity.”27 By allowing participation in NDMS, 
hospitals and managed care organizations would essentially be releasing their most 
valuable assets, thus reducing the hospitals’ ability to treat and care for patients. 
The medical system must also anticipate that many of their health care workers will 
likely be unavailable for extended periods of time during the pandemic. Health care 
workers will be more susceptible to contracting the flu due to their contact with infected 
patients. This will have tremendous consequences on the overall medical system, as it 
will further reduce already deficient staffing levels and the capacity to treat flu and non-
flu patients. Additionally, various personal issues will undoubtedly deplete the health 
care workforce as medical professionals remain home to care for sick family members, 
or refuse to come to work altogether for fear of becoming infected and thus potentially 
infecting family members. “During a catastrophic event, employers must recognize that 
their health care workers are likely to be as (or even more) concerned than the average 
citizen, because they might have a greater understanding of the associated risks.”28  
Every hospital operates on a budget, and the vast majority does not have a sufficient 
capital surplus to provide adequate training and supplies necessary for a pandemic. 
“One third of U.S. hospitals do not meet operating costs; among non-profit hospitals 
which are in the black, operating margins average 3%.”29 In a pandemic, the financial 
pressures will drastically increase as the “money making” services within the hospitals 
are reduced or shut down to care for flu victims. Allowing their employees to participate 
in the NDMS will further exacerbate this issue.  
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The compilation of these factors should be sufficient evidence that civil-based 
medical teams will not be the panacea the federal government portrays them as. 
  
SOLUTIONS 
The World Health Organization estimates that a significant percentage of the world 
population will require some form of medical care in the event of a pandemic. 
Regardless of the pandemic’s severity, additional professional medical assistance will be 
needed at the state or local level. The federal government must decide if this is a 
resource it wants to continue to provide, and then determine the best way to provide it 
in an effective and reliable manner.  
The reliance on civilian-based medical response teams in its current form is 
unworkable. The continued federal promotion of these civilian-based medical response 
teams to the state and local governments must stop. Federal strategic pandemic 
response plans must be modified to recognize that these teams will, most likely, not be 
available to state and local governments in a pandemic. There are indications that top-
level officials within the government are aware of this limitation. In a recent telephone 
interview with a top-level NDMS official, I was informed that other top-level 
government officials in other agencies and departments were told that the NDMS teams 
will probably not be available in a pandemic or, at most, a group of teams would be 
combined to form one team. According to the interviewee, this did not sit well with 
government officials. This fact notwithstanding, the teams remain an identified asset 
within various federal pandemic plans.   
The NDMS and U.S. public health officials must recognize and aggressively inform 
other federal agencies that these civilian-based medical response teams will not be 
available in a pandemic. The return to HHS is a more logical fit for the NDMS, and 
should provide a more effective venue to advocate the deficiencies in this asset, as HHS 
is responsible for the overall preparedness and response planning. 
The NDMS needs to develop a strategic pandemic response plan, regardless. The 
Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza requires that all 
federal agencies adopt and practice such a plan. As a primary supporting agency to HHS 
in a pandemic, it would seem only logical that this would be a priority for NDMS; 
however, one can only assume that the loss of management staffing, and the integration 
into DHS under the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has sidelined this 
initiative.  
Although it is uncertain how many state and local governments actually have these 
federal response teams in their pandemic plans, it is safe to assume that, in a pandemic, 
most state and locals would require additional medical assistance. The projected 
number of patients requiring medical attention, the anticipated reduced medical 
workforce, and the insufficient national public health infrastructure are primary 
indicators that supplemental medical assistance will be necessary. If preparedness is the 
key, and the state and local governments have incorporated these teams within their 
preparedness plans, then truly how prepared are they? 
If the federal government wants to continue to provide supplemental medical 
assistance teams that would respond to assist states and locals in a pandemic, then it 
must develop a national system of medical professionals who are dedicated full-time 
employees. The mission would center on domestic response for all medical and public 
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health matters throughout the United States, and the system would have a military or 
para-military structure. There would not be any question as to whether team members 
would participate in a pandemic; this would be an anticipated response, a professional 
responsibility and requirement similar to the commitments made by our military  
personnel. There would not be the issue of medical professionals receiving permission 
from their sponsoring medical facilities and hospitals, as the federal government would 
be the employer. Additionally, the team could be deployed for the extended periods of 
time projected in a pandemic.  This system could be utilized for a variety of medical and 
public health responses throughout the United States: WMD incidents, epidemics, 
vaccination programs, large scale emergencies, and natural disasters. When not 
deployed, the system could focus on medical and public health preparedness efforts, 
operating as the primary conduit between state, local, and federal agencies. This system 
could be developed from scratch, or the U.S. Public Health system could be augmented 
to provide this capability. 
    
CONCLUSION 
There are few certainties in a pandemic; we do not know when the next pandemic will 
occur; we do not know the severity, or how long it will last. What we do know, however, 
is preparedness is the key. But effective preparedness requires a continuous evaluation 
that is critical and objective. An objective and critical evaluation of the use of the NDMS 
civilian-based response teams in a pandemic would discover an impractical and 
unreliable system. Already there is sufficient evidence that this system will not work 
and, as such, the continued federal promotion of this system borders on criminal 
negligence. The short term solution is simple: instruct state and local governments that 
these assets will not be available in a pandemic. This awareness will allow state and local 
governments to critically and objectively prepare for a pandemic. The continued federal 
reliance on the NDMS to support state and locals in a pandemic is unsound. The federal 
government should instead focus its preparedness efforts on enhancing the public 
health infrastructure, expanding company incentives for vaccine development, and 
developing and stockpiling vaccines and anti-viral medications. These preparedness 
efforts will have the greatest utility in a pandemic until a sufficiently staffed, funded, 
and trained federal workforce and system is established.   
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